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I. Introduction 
 The law and finance literature (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) highlights that legal rules protecting 
outside investors vary systematically across countries. As the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) predicts, 
market participants often respond to the inefficiencies from weak investor protection laws by resorting to 
contractual and private enforcement mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate one instance of this 
broader phenomenon. We examine Project Finance as a private response to the risks posed by the 
financing of large investment projects in countries with weak investor protection.  
Project Finance (hereafter PF) represents an important financing mechanism for large investment 
projects. Worldwide, the use of PF has grown dramatically, from a then-record of $217 billion in 2001 to 
a record $328 billion in 2006 (Esty and Sesia, 2007), though current numbers are lower at $195 billion in 
2012. Between 1991 and 2012, PF raised over $2.5 trillion to fund almost 6000 projects.1 Moreover, the 
incidence of PF in a country correlates with its economic growth (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010). Yet, the 
choice between financing large projects through in-house Corporate Debt Finance (hereafter CDF) versus 
through PF has yet to be studied empirically. Our investigation intends to fill this gap. 
We observe that PF is considerably more prevalent, relative to CDF, in French than in English 
legal origin countries: 55% versus 36%. Even when we exclude observations for the U.S., we find this 
difference to be quite significant: 55% versus 37%. Investor protection laws are also weaker in French 
legal origin countries than in the English legal origin countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), suggesting 
that investor protection laws may be important in determining the choice of PF versus CDF. 
In PF, a legally independent project company is created to own and invest in the project, and the 
project debt is structured without recourse to the sponsors (Nevitt and Fabozzi 2000; Esty 2003). With 
this structure, project cash flows become the essential means for repaying the lender. Verifiability of cash 
flows, therefore, becomes crucial. PF enhances verifiability by the lender through (i) contractual 
constraints on cash flows that are made possible by the special structuring of the PF company; and 
                                                     
1 Source: Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database 
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(ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that are under the 
lender's control and into which project cash flows are required to be deposited. Contractual constraints on 
cash flows are possible because the Project Company (i) owns only the single, discrete project for which 
it is created; and (ii) is legally separate from the sponsor. Therefore, project cash flows can be 
meaningfully separated from the sponsor's other cash flows. 
With CDF, by contrast, the commingling of cash flows from multiple projects makes it difficult 
to segregate project cash flows. Lender monitoring of project cash flows is therefore difficult. Moreover, 
tightly enforced cash flow constraints similar to those in PF would impede managerial discretion in CDF, 
which involves not only multiple projects but also internal capital markets within the corporate entity. 
Therefore, contractual arrangements that are possible in PF cannot be effected in CDF. The choice of PF 
versus CDF thus presents a trade-off. CDF offers managerial flexibility with respect to allocation of cash 
flows, but these cash flows are less verifiable. Conversely, PF offers cash flow verifiability, but the 
attendant cash flow controls preclude managers from funding project-related growth opportunities from 
internal cash flows or reallocating cash flows across multiple projects, as is possible with CDF.2  
In countries with weak investor protection, it is a priori unclear whether firms and their lenders 
will prefer the cash flow verifiability that PF offers or the financing flexibility of CDF. PF might be 
attractive in a country whose corporate and bankruptcy laws provide weak investor protection, since CDF 
can lead to expropriation of outside investors by corporate insiders. As in Diamond (2004), stronger laws 
against insider stealing limit diversion of cash flows ex post. Ex ante, this causes a rightward shift in the 
entire distribution of cash flows available to all claimants — creditors as well as equityholders. Given 
their concave payoffs, creditors care about the left tail of the cash flow distribution. Therefore, stronger 
laws against insider stealing increase the prospects for repayment and decrease the probability of default 
in CDF. At the same time, stronger creditor rights enhance the lender's threat to liquidate collateral assets. 
                                                     
2 Project Finance also involves significant transaction costs. For example, creating a stand-alone project company 
may take from six months to more than a year, and the contracting and other transaction costs may consume from 
5% to 10% of the project's total cost (Esty, 2003). Second, the up-front fees are considerably higher for project debt 
than for corporate debt. Finally, lenders to project companies charge advisory fees of up to 50 to 100 basis points for 
advice on the financial structure of the transaction (Esty, 2003b). 
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When cash flows are not verifiable, as with CDF, the lender's threat to liquidate collateral assets is central 
to forcing the borrower to repay (Hart 1995). However, the lender can liquidate collateral assets only if 
the legal system provides strong creditor rights. Firms and their lenders may respond to weak investor 
protection by employing PF, where cash flow verifiability reduces agency costs and enhances the project's 
debt capacity. With respect to financing of large investment projects, then, PF offers a private contractual 
and organizational substitute for investor protection laws. This analysis suggests that PF should be more 
prevalent than CDF in countries with weak investor protection.  
However, weak investor protection laws may have the exact opposite effect. Because external 
financing is more expensive in countries offering weak investor protection, firms may value the flexibility 
offered by CDF, which enables firms to preserve larger internal capital markets. This flexibility may be 
more important to firms than the cash flow verifiability that PF offers. Ultimately, which of these two 
effects manifests is an empirical question, which we attempt to answer in this paper. 
Since Project Finance involves primarily bank debt for large investments (Esty 2003), we test our 
hypotheses by comparing bank loans for PF with bank loans to conventional corporations for their large 
investments, i.e. CDF. We carefully identify categories of CDF loans such that for each loan in our 
sample, the counterfactual choice between PF and our sampled categories of CDF is plausible. The 
sample of bank loans is drawn from Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database, which offers the best 
source for international bank loans (Qian and Strahan, 2007).  
Given our cross-country setting, inferring a causal relationship between country-level investor 
protection laws and the deal-level choice between PF and CDF presents several challenges. First, country-
level laws governing insider stealing and creditor rights may be correlated with other country-level 
unobserved factors. Second, agency cost considerations are not the sole motivation for PF. Proving our 
agency cost story requires that we account for other possible motivations as well – most importantly, 
those relating to asset choice, debt overhang, and risk management (Esty 2003). Third, potential sample 
selection problems could bias our results. Fourth, differences in tax rates and tax treatment of debt across 
different countries may affect the choice of PF versus CDF. 
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To address such econometric concerns, we undertake difference-in-difference and triple-
difference tests that exploit exogenous country-level changes in (i) creditor rights; and (ii) laws relating to 
shareholder derivative suits, which affect shareholders' legal protection. In particular, to highlight a causal 
mechanism for our results and to rule out the effect of any country-level omitted variables, we investigate 
inter-industry differences in the effect of investor protection laws on the choice of PF versus CDF. We 
conduct triple-difference tests interacting measures of industry-level (a) free cash flow to assets and (b) 
asset tangibility with the variables reflecting the exogenous legal changes. Since PF renders cash flows 
verifiable, we predict that the effect of these legal changes would be disproportionately greater for 
industries with higher free cash flows, and hence higher agency costs (Jensen 1986). Conversely, we 
predict that the effect of our legal changes would be disproportionately weaker in tangible-asset-intensive 
industries. Because tangible assets are easier to monitor and harder to steal, they provide more attractive 
collateral than intangible assets. Since tangible-asset collateral provides better protection against default 
than intangible assets, the increased likelihood of strategic default from weak investor protection is less a 
constraint on firms’ ability to raise CDF in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in intangible-asset-
intensive industries. Therefore, investor protection should affect the choice of PF versus CDF 
disproportionately less in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in intangible-asset-intensive industries. 
We instrument for industry-level free cash flows and asset tangibility in a given country using 
measures of U.S. industry free cash flow and asset tangibility (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Consistent with 
our hypotheses, we find that changes in investor protection have disproportionately greater effects in 
industries with higher agency costs of free cash flow and disproportionately weaker effects in tangible-
asset-intensive industries. These triple-difference tests alleviate endogeneity and sample selection 
concerns on many key dimensions and thereby offer strong evidence supporting our hypotheses. These 
tests also enable us to highlight the agency cost channel through which investor protection laws affect the 
choice of PF versus CDF. 
The economic effects are significant. In our difference-in-difference tests, a decrease in creditor 
rights increases the likelihood of PF at least by 3.4%. Also, an improvement in shareholders' right to 
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derivative suits decreases the likelihood of PF at least by 7.1%. Given the baseline PF percentage of 42%, 
these differences are economically significant. 
Our key contribution is to offer a new illustration that law matters, this time in the context of debt 
financing of large investment projects. Stronger investor protection laws enhance debt capacity in CDF by 
improving borrowers' ability to credibly commit ex-ante that they will not strategically default ex-post. 
Like concentrated ownership for equity investors (La Porta et al. 1998), PF represents the private 
response of firms and their investors – here, lenders – to weak investor protection. By employing PF as a 
counter-factual to CDF, our results imply that stronger investor protection encourages CDF by obviating 
the need for a costly and specialized form of financing that renders cash flows verifiable to the lender, 
namely PF. To our knowledge, our study is the first to offer such large sample cross-country evidence. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III explains the key 
institutional features of PF. Section IV describes our hypotheses. Section V describes our data while 
Section VI presents the results. Section VII provides a discussion of our results. Section VIII concludes. 
II. Review of Literature 
As a broad research inquiry, our paper is closely related to the law and finance literature (see La 
Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Djankov et. al., 2006; Djankov et. al., 2007). As noted earlier, PF offers an 
important financing vehicle for large investment projects and correlates with a country’s economic 
growth. Our study complements the prior literature by examining the effect of investor protection laws on 
this important financing choice. We also show that legal origin matters through the provision of investor 
protection by reducing the effect of agency costs on financing choices. By identifying a micro channel for 
the effect of legal origins on financing outcomes, this paper complements Qian and Strahan (2007), who 
find evidence that country level legal and institutional variables affect various price and non-price 
features of debt contracts. 
This paper augments the literature examining PF as an optimal organizational and financing 
choice. Like our study, Chemmanur and John (1996) focus on the cash flow aspect of PF, asserting that 
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PF’s key feature is the segregation of project cash flows from those of the sponsor. Their formal analysis 
shows that PF would dominate other alternatives when the structure of the sponsor's private control 
benefits differs substantially across its projects. Related to this, Shah and Thakor (1987) show that in an 
asymmetric information setting, PF is sometimes optimal because it lowers creditors’ screening costs in 
evaluating the separately-incorporated project cash flows and mitigates the potential contagion effect of 
high debt levels on sponsors’ solvency. In contrast to Chemmanur and John (1996), we argue informally 
here that the (lack of) verifiability of cash flows in (CDF) PF, and therefore the (higher) lower private 
benefits, arise endogenously because of the nature of the contracts that can (not) be written in (CDF) PF. 
Hainz and Kleimeier (2011) offer a contemporaneous study closely related to ours. They investigate loan 
contracting in environments with high political risk. Controlling for the legal and institutional 
environment, they show that political risk correlates with both the use of PF and the participation of 
development banks in loan syndicates, suggesting that PF and the presence of development banks help 
mitigate political risk.3 
Esty (2003) articulates the important institutional details of PF and argues that the governance 
structure of project companies combines with high leverage to mitigate agency conflicts. He supports his 
analysis with detailed case studies and field research. Corielli at al. (2010) study the effects on PF of 
projects’ non-financial contracts. They show that use of non-financial contracts—contracts for 
engineering and construction, agreements for inputs and outputs, and operation and maintenance 
agreements—reduces loan spreads by reducing agency costs and volatility of project cash flow. Also 
when sponsors are not key counterparties to those contracts, loan spreads and lenders’ demands for 
sponsor equity contributions are lower. Gatti et al. (2013) demonstrate the crucial certification role that 
lead arranging banks play in PF, finding that more prestigious lead arrangers reduce overall loan spreads. 
                                                     
3 Interestingly for our purposes, they find a positive correlation between creditor rights and the incidence of PF, 
which is contrary to our results below. However, their sample differs from ours in a number of respects: Their 
sample excludes U.S. borrowers. Also their comparator set of non-PF loans includes what they call “asset-based” 
full recourse loans, based on a broader range of DealScan loan purpose categories than ours. As explained below in 
Section V.A., we include only “Capital Expenditure” loans and large “Corporate Purpose” term loans as our CDF 
comparators to PF. Hainz and Kleimeier’s sample, however, additionally includes loans for “telecom buildout,” 
“aircraft and ship finance,” “leasing,” and “real estate.” 
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Berkovitch and Kim (1990) formally show that if information between debtholders and equityholders is 
symmetric, PF simultaneously alleviates the problems of under- and over-investment. We complement 
these studies by employing a large sample of international loans to demonstrate empirically that PF offers 
a private substitute for legal rules designed to reduce agency conflicts.  
Other studies have examined the relationship between PF and legal environments. Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000) compare PF loans to non-PF loans, and find that PF loans are far more likely to be 
extended to borrowers in riskier countries, particularly countries with higher political and economic risks. 
Esty and Megginson (2003) analyze syndicated PF loans to examine the effect of creditor rights and 
reliable legal enforcement on the pattern of debt ownership. We contribute to this literature by 
documenting the effect of a specific country-level risk – the quality of legal protection of outside 
investors – on the choice of PF versus CDF. 
III. Institutional Aspects of PF 
PF has four essential features. First, it involves creation of a legally independent Project 
Company to own and invest in the project. Second, the Project Company invests only in the particular 
project for which it is created; it is typically dissolved once the project is completed. Third, the project 
debt is structured without recourse to the sponsors (Nevitt and Fabozzi, 2000; Esty, 2003). These three 
features together imply that cash flows from the project are the essential means to repay the lender. This 
observation leads to the fourth essential aspect of PF, which has gone underemphasized in the literature 
but is the focus of our analysis: PF includes severe constraints on the use and disposition of project cash 
flows. Compared to CDF, the sponsoring firms have considerably reduced discretion over project cash 
flows. PF also typically involves very high leverage, the bulk of which is in the form of bank debt. 
In PF, project cash flows can be easily separated from those of the sponsor since the Project 
Company is legally independent and consists of a single project. This enables the Project Company to 
enter into detailed arrangements with its lenders concerning the use of cash, including private 
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enforcement through lender-controlled project accounts. This extremely detailed control of cash flow is 
unique to PF, which is sometimes referred to as "contractual finance." (Esty and Megginson, 2003). 
Contractual arrangements dictate a cash flow waterfall, specifying the order in which project cash 
flows must be distributed. Typically, the borrower is required to use project cash flows first in satisfaction 
of operating expenses, and then to pay interest and loan principal. The contracts also structure how excess 
cash flow – cash flow available in excess of what is required to satisfy project expenses and debt 
repayment – is distributed. The contracts adjust the borrower's repayment schedule for a number of 
contingencies based on pre-defined financial ratios. The contract commonly includes "cash sharing", 
"lockup" and "mandatory cash sweep" provisions, which effectively amortize debt at a rate faster than 
originally scheduled if the project performs appreciably better or appreciably worse than anticipated. We 
refer the reader to Borgonovo and Gatti (2013) for a detailed description of the covenants used in PF. 
The waterfall arrangement is enforced through a variety of project accounts that are typically 
(a) under the lender's control, and (b) held offshore in order to mitigate currency and other political risks 
(Buljevich and Park, 1999). These accounts include (i) a proceeds account, into which project revenues 
are deposited; (ii) a disbursement account, into which all payments to the lender and any distributions to 
equityholders are deposited; and (iii) a debt service reserve account, in which cash flows are set aside to 
enable payment of principal and interest in case project revenues are not available. Since these accounts 
are controlled by the lender, they provide the lender a framework to monitor the borrower's activities 
without getting involved in the borrower's day-to-day affairs. These lender-controlled project accounts 
lend teeth to the elaborate and finely-tuned contracting undertaken in the cash flow waterfall contract. 
These teeth matter especially in countries with weak legal environments, where writing and enforcing 
contracts may be especially costly. 
IV. Empirical Hypotheses 
Our prior is that in countries with weak investor protection, firms and their lenders will generally 
prefer the cash flow verifiability of PF to the financing flexibility of CDF, and we articulate our 
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hypotheses accordingly. Since cash flows are verifiable with PF but more difficult to verify in CDF, we 
predict that: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Ceteris paribus, CDF is more likely than PF in countries where creditor rights in 
bankruptcy are stronger. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Ceteris paribus, CDF is more likely than PF in countries where the protection against 
insider stealing is stronger. 
As well, because the entirety of project cash flows can be pledged in PF, but only a portion of 
cash flows can be pledged in CDF, this difference in pledgeable cash flows increases with the level of 
free cash flows in an industry. Since the pledgeability of cash flows in CDF increases with investor 
protection, we also predict that: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Ceteris paribus, the marginal effects of laws against insider stealing and creditor rights 
on the choice of PF versus CDF increase with the level of free cash flow in an industry. 
 PF is typically collateralized through project cash flows, while CDF is collateralized through 
project/sponsor assets. Because tangible assets are easier to monitor and harder to steal, they provide 
more attractive collateral than intangible assets. Since tangible-asset collateral provides better protection 
against default than intangible assets, the increased likelihood of strategic default from weak investor 
protection is less a constraint on firms’ ability to raise CDF in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in 
intangible-asset-intensive industries. Therefore, the marginal effect of investor protection on the choice of 
PF versus CDF is disproportionately lower in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in intangible-asset-
intensive industries. Thus: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Ceteris paribus, the marginal effects of laws against insider stealing and creditor rights 
on the choice of PF versus CDF decrease with the level of tangible assets in an industry. 
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V. Data, Sample and Proxies 
A. Sample 
We test our predictions using bank loans for PF and CDF from LPC Dealscan; thus our sample 
includes only firms with PF or CDF loans. Eighty percent of the debt in PF comprises bank debt (Esty, 
2003), which is typically in the form of large internationally syndicated loans. We remove syndicated 
loans with lenders from multiple countries. This enables us to focus on the effect of investor protection on 
the choice of PF versus CDF within a given country. 
We carefully identify categories of CDF loans such that for each loan in our sample, the 
counterfactual choice between PF and our sampled categories of CDF is plausible. To determine which 
CDF loans to include, we rely on Dealscan's attribution of the primary purpose for each loan, as well as 
industry classification. Since PF involves the creation of "a single purpose capital asset" (Esty, 2003), 
CDF loans with "Capital Expenditures" as their primary purpose offer a natural set of counterfactuals to 
PF. Indeed, after winsorizing at the 99% level to exclude outliers, we find in Panel A of Table 1 that the 
loan amounts for Capital Expenditure and PF loans are very similar. The distributions of Capital 
Expenditure and PF loans are also similar with respect to loan maturity and the number of lenders.4  
In addition to Capital Expenditure loans, we also include large term loans for "Corporate 
Purposes" in our sampled CDF loans. Since PF involves large investments, large term loans for 
"Corporate Purposes" comprise another category where the counterfactual choice of PF is plausible. 
Consistent with the minimum loan amount for PF loans, which is $10.0 million after winsorizing at the 
95% level, we exclude all Corporate Purpose Term Loans with loan amounts (converted in dollars) less 
than $10.0 million. After this exclusion, we find in Panel A of Table 1 that the mean and median loan 
amounts for Corporate Purpose term loans are slightly smaller than that for PF loans. Examining the 
distributions for loan size, loan maturity and number of lenders across the three loan categories suggests 
that the distribution of loans is very similar for both CDF and PF. Panel B of Table 1 shows the 
                                                     
4 At the median (mean), the amount of the capital expenditure loan equals 12% (18%) of the CDF borrower’s total 
assets, confirming that the identified capital expenditure projects indeed represent large investments. 
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distribution of PF and CDF bank loans by industry.5 Panel C displays the summary statistics for the key 
explanatory variables.  
Our sample includes loans originated from 1993 to 2007; we terminate our sample in 2007 to 
avoid the effects of changes due to the financial crisis starting in 2008. We treat as outliers those countries 
with less than five PF or CDF observations during our sample period, and we remove these countries 
from our sample. Our final deal-level sample contains 18257 deals from 43 countries.6 In our industry 
level tests, we have a balanced sample of 4515 observations (43 countries x 15 years (1993-2007) x 7 
broad industries). Table 2 displays the number of observations by country, the number of PF and CDF 
deals, and the percentage of PF deals. 
B. Key Explanatory Variables 
Table 3 provides a summary of all the explanatory variables and their sources. In the spirit of 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), where the ex-ante financing outcome is affected by the ex-post likelihood 
of a sponsor/manager being caught stealing, our proxy for protection against insider stealing is the index 
of ex-post private control of self-dealing constructed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2006) (DLLS). This measure captures the extent of ex-post disclosure that the controlling shareholder 
must provide in order to engage in a self-dealing transaction and the ease of proving wrongdoing once 
such a transaction is detected.7 We also rely on one component of the DLLS index—shareholders’ right to 
bring a derivative suit—in our differencing regressions. We use the creditor rights index constructed in 
                                                     
5 In examining our data, we found that a few industries were outliers in terms of the dominance of PF over CDF 
deals or vice versa. Therefore, to ensure the integrity of our comparisons, we exclude all loans for Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing (SIC codes 1-8) and Public Administration (SIC codes 91-97). The former shows only seven 
PF deals during our sample period while the latter shows only four CDF deals. 
6 A loan deal in Dealscan may contain multiple facilities such as a term loan, a line of credit, etc. We carefully 
eyeballed the data and found that multiple facilities in a deal can be identified when (a) the borrower name and the 
deal active date are identical; (b) the primary purpose is the same across the facilities, and (c) aggregating the 
tranche amounts on each of the facilities yields a sum equal to the loan amount. Hence, we used these three criteria 
to aggregate the data from the facility to the deal level. For our Corporate Purpose Term Loans, we include only 
those deals that contain a facility designated as a Term Loan. 
7 This survey measure is not subject to inconsistent coding/ definition (Spamann 2010). 
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Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007) (DMS) to proxy for creditor rights. A higher value for the DMS 
index indicates stronger creditor rights. 
The laws against insider stealing and creditor rights we measure involve countries’ corporate and 
bankruptcy laws, which are generally mandated based on the location of the project. As Bebchuk and 
Guzman note, the dominant approach to transnational bankruptcies is territorial (Bebchuk & Guzman 
1999). Though international loan agreements frequently include a choice of law clause selecting U.K. or 
New York law (or the law of some other mature commercial jurisdiction) (Novo 2007), this choice of 
governing law affects only the construction of the credit contract, and not the laws we measure—
shareholder rights and creditor rights in bankruptcy. Moreover, the creditor rights we measure have far 
greater impact on creditor recoveries than the relatively marginal advantages of New York’s substantive 
law on financial contracts, such as limitations on lender liability (Eisenberg & Miller 2009). 
VI. Results 
We undertake a step-wise analysis to infer a causal relationship between country-level laws and 
the deal-level choice between PF and CDF. We first offer preliminary evidence favoring our hypotheses 
in the form of univariate tests. Second, we present the results of difference-in-difference tests exploiting 
exogenous country-level changes in investor protection laws. We support these results with a number of 
robustness checks to address potential endogeneity concerns. Third, to highlight a causal mechanism for 
our results, we run triple-difference tests to investigate inter-industry differences—based on industry-level 
free cash flow—in the effect of investor protection on the choice of PF versus CDF. Finally, we discuss 
potential sample selection concerns. 
A. Preliminary Evidence 
Figure 1 plots the percentage of PF in a country against creditor rights in each country. The graph 
illustrates that the percentage of PF is negatively associated with the level of creditor rights. This 
univariate finding is consistent with our Hypothesis 1. Similarly, Figure 2 plots the percentage of PF 
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against the proxy for protection against insider stealing. As with the level of creditor rights, this graph 
shows that the percentage of PF is negatively associated with our proxy for protection against insider 
stealing, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Table 2 also offers data consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. It 
shows that the likelihood of PF relative to CDF is considerably higher in the French legal origin countries 
than in the English legal origin countries: 55% versus 36%. Even when we exclude the U.S. observations, 
we find this difference to be quite significant: 55% versus 37%. Since investor protection laws are weaker 
in French than in the English legal origin countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), this is consistent with 
our view that investor protection laws may be important in determining the choice of PF versus CDF. 
B. Difference-in-Difference Tests 
Inferring a causal relationship between PF and investor protection laws presents a challenge 
insofar as the relationship may be driven by country-level unobserved factors.8 First, country-level laws 
governing insider stealing and creditor rights may be correlated with other country-level unobserved 
factors. For example, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that PF is more likely in countries with 
higher political and economic risks. The incidence of PF in a country may also be correlated with its time 
varying economic growth (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010). Second, agency cost considerations are not the 
sole motivation for PF. Proving our agency cost story requires that we account for other possible 
motivations as well – most importantly, those relating to asset choice, debt overhang, and risk 
management (Esty 2003). Third, since we have to rely on bank loans for our study, potential sample 
selection problems could hobble our analysis. Fourth, differences in tax rates and tax treatment of debt 
across different countries may affect the choice of PF. 
To identify the causal effect of investor protection on the incidence of PF, we exploit exogenous 
country-level changes in creditor rights and in shareholders' right to bring derivative suits.  
                                                     
8 We run unreported logit regressions for the likelihood of PF, obtaining evidence consistent with Figures 1-2. 
However, the possibility of country-level unobserved factors precludes us from drawing strong conclusions from 
these tests concerning our hypothesized effects. 
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Countries differ with respect to the rights they offer creditors during bankruptcy. The DMS 
creditor rights index assigns each country an index value from 0 to 4 based on how many of the following 
four creditor rights are recognized in bankruptcy: (i) no automatic stay applies to secured creditors' rights; 
(ii) secured creditors are paid first in bankruptcy; (iii) no majority creditor consent is required to initiate 
bankruptcy; and (iv) management is automatically ousted upon bankruptcy. Panel A of Table 4 shows the 
countries that underwent a change in creditor rights during our sample period. This list is drawn from 
Appendix A of Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007). 
Wider availability of shareholder derivative suits imposes stronger constraints on insider stealing, 
and this legal feature is included as a component of the DLLS index of ex-post private control of self-
dealing. A shareholder derivative suit is an action brought by a shareholder of a company in the name and 
on behalf of that company in order to seek redress for a harm done to the company by the company's 
directors or officers.9 Some countries restrict such suits based on the size of the putative shareholder-
plaintiff's holdings in the firm. Others may impose a demand requirement, which forces the shareholder 
first to petition the company's board for redress before suit may proceed.  
Panel B of Table 4 shows the countries that underwent a change in shareholders' right to bring 
derivative suits. This list is constructed from Siems et. al. (2008), as well as searches for changes in these 
laws in our sample countries through Lexis-Nexis Global. All these countries improved shareholders' 
derivative suit rights during our sample period. Three countries—Germany, Italy and Mexico—lowered 
the minimum ownership requirements for shareholders to file derivative suits, while Australia and Chile 
instituted the mechanism of shareholder derivative suits. Since the countries that effected changes in 
creditor rights do not overlap with countries that changed shareholder derivative suit rights, we can 
cleanly infer the effect of each of these changes. 
                                                     
9 Because the firm's top managers–who ordinarily decide for the company who it will or will not sue–cannot 
generally be expected to subject themselves to suit by the company, shareholders are given the right to sue 
management in the company's name. Such an action is "derivative" in the sense that the right to sue belongs not to 
the party actually bringing the action, but is `derived' from the company's rights. Given that it is the company's rights 
that are sought to be vindicated in such an action, the proceeds of a successful action are awarded to the corporation 
and not to the individual shareholders that initiated the suit. 
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Figure 3 depicts the difference-in-difference of the effect of increases in creditor rights on the 
percentage of PF to CDF at the country level while Figure 4 depicts the difference-in-difference effect of 
increases in shareholder derivative suit rights on the percentage of PF to CDF at the country level. In 
these figures, we plot the residuals from a regression of the percentage of PF on country and year fixed 
effects. Year 0 corresponds to the year of the legal change. Year -1 is one year before the legal change, 
and Year 1 is one year after the legal change, and so on. For each legal change in the treatment country, 
we define year 0 for the control group of countries as the year when the legal change happened in the 
treatment country; years -5 to +5 are then defined accordingly for each legal change. We then average by 
event year the percentage of PF for the treatment and control groups separately. In both figures, we notice 
that the time trend in the percentage of PF before the legal change is very similar for the treatment and 
control groups, which suggests that in the absence of the legal change, the trends for the percentage of PF 
in both groups would have been similar. Thus, figures 3 and 4 show that the key identifying assumption 
for a difference-in-difference estimation appears to hold in our sample. Moreover, we notice in Figures 3 
and 4 that the percentage of PF decreased following increases in investor protection. 
1. Panel Regressions  
We implement the econometric variants of Figures 3 and 4 to test for the effect of changes in 
investor protection laws using the following regression: 
(1) prob y = 1 = β + β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β ∗ DerivativeSuitRules + ϵ  
where y  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank loan deal to borrower k in country c in year t is 
PF and 0 if the deal corresponds to a capital expenditure loan or a corporate purpose term loan (our two 
categories of CDF loans). CreditorRights  is defined as in Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007). DerivativeSuitRules  equals one for the years after a change occurs in the law governing shareholder 
derivative suits in the countries listed in panel B of table 4, and equals zero otherwise.   β  and β  denote 
borrower and year fixed effects respectively. Since a borrower's country and industry do not change 
through time, borrower fixed effects subsume the country and industry fixed effects.  
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Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we predict that β , β <0, which we test in Table 5. In all our 
tests in Table 5, we compute cluster-robust standard errors using the cluster-correlated Huber-White 
covariance matrix method, where we cluster by country. Column (1) of Table 5 tests specification (1) 
above. In Column (2), we repeat specification (1) but include (country * industry) fixed effects instead of 
borrower fixed effects. While all our other specifications use 2-digit SIC industry definitions, in this 
specification we define industries as per Panel B of Table 1 to avoid an extraordinarily large number of 
dummies. In both Columns (1) and (2), we find that β <0 and β <0 and are statistically significant, 
thereby confirming Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
We next aggregate deals at the 2-digit SIC level i in country c in year t and estimate an OLS 
regression that includes country, year and industry fixed effects: 
(2) y = β + β + β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β ∗ DerivativeSuitRules + ϵ  
Column (3) of Table 5 shows that our results remain strong in this specification. Using Columns (1)-(3), 
we estimate the economic effect as follows. Compared to countries that did not undergo a change, an 
increase in creditor rights decreased the likelihood of PF by at least 4.4% and at most by 7.2%; a decrease 
in creditor rights increased the likelihood of PF similarly. Given the baseline PF percentage of 42%, these 
differences are economically significant. Compared to countries that did not undergo a change in rules 
governing derivative suits, the increase in shareholder protection in the countries in our sample decreased 
the likelihood of PF by at least 9.1% and at most by 13.7%. Again, given the baseline PF percentage of 
42%, these differences are economically significant. 
A potential source of bias stems from the possibility that weak investor protection may cause 
sponsors to forego projects. Since the set of foregone projects is not observable and this set would 
contract with an increase in investor protection, this dynamic could account for our results by simply 
increasing the number of CDF deals, even if PF were not a substitute for CDF (and therefore the choice of 
PF versus CDF would not vary with investor protection). We test for this potential bias by examining the 
effect of changes in investor protection on the number of PF deals, which should move inversely with 
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investor protection if our hypotheses are correct, but may not move at all if sampling bias from foregone 
projects is at work. In Column (4) of Table 5, we use the log of the number of PF deals in a country, 
industry, year as the dependent variable. We find that the number of PF deals does move inversely with 
investor protection laws. While a creditor rights change leads to a 14.6% change in the number of PF 
deals (= e-0.158 -1), a change in rules governing shareholder lawsuits changes the number of PF deals by 
7.0% (= e-0.073 -1). In Column (5) of Table 5, to control for the possibility that the number of PF deals may 
be greater in larger countries, we normalize the number of PF deals in a country, industry, year by the 
country GDP in the particular year. This normalization also enables us to control for the possibility that 
firms in civil law countries may not use the syndicated loan market for CDF loans as much as firms in 
common law countries. This may be the case if relationship banking is more likely in civil law countries 
because loans from relationship banks are less likely to be syndicated. From Columns (4) and (5) of Table 
5, we conclude that the hypothesized effects remain strong using these alternative measures. 
Finally, to alleviate concerns that industry-level shocks may be driving our results, in unreported 
tests, we re-examine the above specifications by replacing the year fixed effects with industry*year fixed 
effects. Our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. 
2. Time-Varying Control Variables 
The tests in Table 5 control for several time-varying sources of heterogeneity. First, we include 
several deal-level controls. The loan spread variable and the indicator variable for an unrated borrower 
proxy for the various lender costs from asymmetric information relating to the borrower. Rated borrowers 
are more transparent than unrated borrowers. As well, greater information asymmetry will cause the 
lender to charge a higher interest rate in order to account for the higher risk. If asymmetric information 
varies between PF and CDF loans, the loan spread variable and the dummy for unrated borrowers enable 
us to control for these effects. The variable for loan amount enables us to capture the possible contagion 
effect that higher debt can have on the sponsor’s solvency. Shah and Thakor (1987) argue that separate 
incorporation, for example through PF, can mitigate this contagion effect. The loan amount variable 
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controls for this motivation for PF. We also control for the loan’s maturity and include a dummy for 
whether the loan is secured. Our deal-level tests in Columns (1) and (2) include these deal-level controls. 
Our industry-level tests in Columns (3)-(5) include the averages of the deal-level variables as controls. 
Among these variables, we find the secured loan dummy to be positively correlated with PF, which is 
consistent with the greater risk associated with PF loans. We also find the senior loan dummy to be 
negatively correlated with PF. This result is consistent with the lower verifiability of cash flows in CDF, 
which causes CDF lenders to demand seniority. We also find loan maturity to be positively correlated 
with PF, consistent with PF loans having longer initial terms than CDF loans. 
Table 5 also includes several industry-level controls. To capture the agency costs of free cash 
flow in an industry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), we follow Lang, Stulz, and Walking 
(1999) by including the median ratio of free cash flow to assets for each 4-digit SIC industry. We find a 
positive association between the likelihood of PF and industry free cash flow. We also include the median 
ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the median Tobin's Q, and the median ratio of long term debt to 
assets for each 4-digit SIC industry. We note that PF is positively associated with tangible-asset-intensive 
industries and industries with greater leverage. We also control for the possibility that PF could be 
advantageous in reducing the deadweight costs resulting from debt-equity conflicts that arise with CDF—
in particular, leverage-induced under-investment or debt overhang. These deadweight costs arise when a 
firm has high leverage and significant growth opportunities, so we capture the extent of these deadweight 
costs at the industry level with our interaction of long term debt to assets with Tobin's Q. The positive 
coefficient on this interaction implies that PF is associated with industries with greater deadweight costs 
from such debt-equity conflicts. While the coefficient of long term debt to assets is also significant 
independent of the interaction, the effect of Tobin's Q is absorbed completely in its interaction with long 
term debt to assets. This suggests that while leverage is correlated with the choice of PF over and above 
the deadweight costs from debt-equity conflicts, growth opportunities are associated with PF primarily 
through their effect on debt-equity conflicts. 
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Finally, we include country-level controls. We capture time-varying influences of economic 
growth using the log of GDP per capita and time-varying availability of debt financing at the macro level 
using the log of private credit to GDP per capita. We find that the likelihood of PF is positively correlated 
with economic growth, consistent with the findings in Kleimeier and Versteeg (2010). However, the 
availability of debt financing does not seem to correlate with the likelihood of PF, which alleviates 
concerns that omitted variables related to changes in credit availability are driving our results. 
3. Discussion 
The difference-in-difference tests above alleviate important endogeneity concerns, since the tests 
exploit variation across time in the choice of PF versus CDF within a given industry in a given country. 
The tests thus compare deals with similar assets in the same country, before and after a law change, 
against a control group of deals that involve no such law change. First, the within-country variation that 
we exploit ensures that our results are not driven by time-invariant differences across countries in political 
or economic risk. Second, including fixed effects for each (country*industry) pair accounts for any 
unobserved differences in the choice of PF due to: (i) any country specialization with respect to asset 
choice or industries that might be correlated with investor protection; or (ii) different effective tax rates 
and tax treatment of debt across different industries within a country. Third, as explained in Section 6.5, 
these tests account for selection biases that do not vary with time. These tests therefore provide strong 
evidence that our results are not driven by endogenous country-level or country- and industry-level 
factors.  
C. Robustness Tests. 
1. Tests Excluding U.S. and U.K. Observations 
One potential concern may be that our results are driven by the disproportionate number of U.S. 
and U.K. observations in our sample as the control group. To address this possibility, in unreported tests, 
we replicate the tests in Table 5 after excluding all U.S. observations, and then after separately excluding 
all U.K. observations. Our results remain unchanged. 
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2. Separate Effects Of Creditor Rights Increases/Decreases  
As seen in Table 4, our sample includes countries that experienced increases in creditor rights as 
well as those that experienced decreases. We therefore test separately for the effects of increases and 
decreases on the choice of PF versus CDF. We interact the creditor rights variable with a dummy for 
countries that experienced a decrease in creditor rights and also with a dummy for countries that 
experienced an increase. In unreported tests, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses for both 
increases and decreases. The economic effect of creditor rights decreases is greater than for creditor rights 
increases by at least 40%. 
3. Dynamic Effects of Exogenous Legal Changes 
Given the absence of a differential time trend before the legal changes as demonstrated in Figures 
3 and 4 and the lack of correlation between the timing of legal changes and pre-existing patterns of PF, 
we infer that the legal changes are exogenous to our variable of interest. Nevertheless, we examine the 
dynamics of the effect of the legal changes on the choice of PF versus CDF for possible reverse causality. 
We follow Bertrand and Mulainathan (2003) and decompose the period surrounding a change in creditor 
rights into three separate subperiods: (i) Forwarded Creditor Rights Change, which captures any effect 
from two years to one year before the change); (ii) Contemporaneous Creditor Rights Change, which 
captures the effect in the year of and year after the change); and (iii) Lagged Creditor Rights Change, 
which captures the effect two years after the change and beyond. Similarly, we decompose the change in 
laws governing shareholder derivatives suits into Forwarded Change in Derivative Suit Rules, 
Contemporaneous Change in Derivative Suit Rules, and Lagged Change in Derivative Suit Rules. If the 
coefficient of Forwarded Creditor Rights Change or Forwarded Change in Derivative Suit Rules is 
negative and statistically significant, that may be symptomatic of reverse causation. However in Table 6, 
we find that the coefficients for these variables are not statistically significant, which implies that reverse 
causality may not be a material concern.  
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We do find crucially that the coefficients of the Contemporaneous and Lagged variables are 
negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients for Lagged Creditor Rights Change and 
Lagged Change in Derivative Suit Rules are consistently larger (in absolute value) than for 
Contemporaneous Creditor Rights Change and Contemporaneous Change in Derivative Suit Rules, 
respectively, which implies that the long-run effects of the legal changes are larger than their immediate 
effects. In fact, the long-run effects are at least 80% greater than the immediate effects. 
The absence of reverse causality should not be surprising in our setting because influencing PF is 
usually not a priority that drives regulatory/legal change. As a result, it is unlikely that legal changes were 
effected to influence the choice of PF versus CDF. Neither is it likely that omitted variables that influence 
the choice of PF versus CDF were correlated with the legal changes. Together these various tests strongly 
imply that any effects on the likelihood of PF following the legal changes can plausibly be attributed to 
the legal changes themselves. 
D. Triple-difference Tests 
To highlight a causal mechanism for our results so far – cash flow verifiability in PF – we 
investigate inter-industry differences, based on industry-level free cash flows, in the effect of investor 
protection on the choice of PF versus CDF. We estimate the following model: 
(3) prob y = 1 = β → + β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β2 ∗ DerivativeSuitRulesct + β ∗FCF/Assets , + ϵ  
where y  is defined as in (1) before. β  denotes the fixed effects for each (country, year) pair while  
β →  denotes fixed effects for the 2-digit SIC industry. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we 
instrument for industry-level free cash flow in a given country using the median ratio of free cash flow to 
assets for each 2-digit SIC industry in the U.S. in a given year. Industry-level free cash flow in a given 
sample country may be endogenous, since industrial patterns in a country may be correlated 
systematically with country-wide unobserved factors. However, U.S. industry free cash flow is unlikely to 
be correlated with unobserved determinants of the dependent variable. At the same time, for technological 
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reasons, a U.S. industry cash flow measure is likely to be correlated with cash flow for the same industry 
in a different country, making it a useful instrument for capturing the extent to which cash flows may be 
diverted in a particular industry.10 We exclude observations for U.S. deals to avoid spurious correlation. 
This specification offers our strongest evidence on the causal effect of changes in investor 
protection on the choice of PF versus CDF. First, the inclusion of fixed effects for each (country, year) 
pair enables us to control for the effect of any omitted variables at the country level that may be correlated 
with the changes in investor protection. Changes in investor protection may have coincided with other 
changes in a given country. For example, the incidence of PF in a country correlates with its economic 
growth (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010), and economic growth may correlate with changes in investor 
protection laws as well. The inclusion of (country, year) fixed effects soaks up such confounding factors. 
Consistent with Figures 3 and 4, which suggest the absence of differential trends in the treatment and 
control groups of countries, these fixed effects enable us to directly control for possible differential 
trends, and thereby to identify the causal effect of the legal changes. 
Moreover, if such biases were to vary at the (country, industry, year) level, because we interact 
the changes in investor protection with U.S. industry measures of free cash flow to assets, these biases are 
unlikely to vary with the explanatory variable of interest. β  and β  measure as a triple-difference the 
effect of the legal changes on PF. As earlier noted, we expect the effects of investor protection to be 
stronger in industries with greater free cash flows. Therefore, we expect β , β <0. In our tests in Table 7, 
we compute cluster-robust standard errors using the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix 
method, clustering at the country level. In addition, since the number of treatment clusters (country * two-
digit SIC) is large, we use the asymptotic t-distribution for the tests of significance. Column (1) of Table 
7 presents the results of the logit regression in equation (3). In Column (3), we aggregate deals at a broad 
industry level as described in Panel B of Table 1, in country c in year t using an OLS regression: 
                                                     
10 The proportion of tangible assets in an industry could be an alternative measure for the extent to which cash flows 
could be diverted. However, since an increase in tangible assets also increases the borrower's ability to pledge assets 
as collateral for loans, increased tangibility does not offer as clean an interpretation as an increase in ability to divert 
cash flows. 
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(4) y = β + β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β2 ∗ DerivativeSuitRulesct + β ∗ FCF/Assets , + ϵ  
where FCF/Assets ,  equals the median ratio of free cash flow to assets for the broad industry in the 
U.S. in a given year. The coefficients in Columns (1) and (3) confirm that β  and β  are negative and 
statistically significant, which suggests that legal changes have a disproportionate effect on the choice of 
PF versus CDF in industries where the agency costs of free cash flow are greater. These results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. To ascertain the economic magnitude of the effect, consider two industries: 
one for which the ratio of free cash flow to assets is equal to the mean (0.14) and another for which the 
ratio of free cash flow to assets is one standard deviation greater than the mean (0.31). The economic 
effect of a change in investor protection in the industry with higher free cash flows would be about 120% 
(=0.31/0.14 – 1) greater than in the industry with lower free cash flows. 
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 7 present the results of the regressions in equations (3) and (4), 
respectively, where FCF/Assets ,  is replaced with Tangibility , . These results show that while β  is 
negative and statistically significant, β  is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the legal 
changes have a disproportionately smaller effect on the choice of PF versus CDF in industries where the 
tangible assets are greater, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. For an industry with asset tangibility 
one standard deviation greater than the mean (0.72 versus 0.35), the economic effect of a change in 
investor protection is about 106% (=0.72/0.35 – 1) smaller than the effect in the industry at the mean. 
E. Addressing Sample Selection Concerns 
The exogenous legal changes also enable us to use the difference-in-difference and triple-
difference tests to address sample selection issues that might potentially bias our results. 
1. Counting Financing Deals versus Counting Projects 
First, our sample is comprised of financing deals, as opposed to projects, and we implicitly 
assume a one-to-one correspondence between financing deals and projects. It is possible, however, that 
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this assumption is incorrect. For example, CDF projects might sometimes require more than one round of 
financing, and the number of rounds might vary with investor protection. In that case, our count of CDF 
deals would overstate the likelihood of CDF by treating multiple financings of the same project as 
separate financings for separate projects. However, our difference-in-difference tests using exogenous 
country-level legal changes mitigate this concern. First, our within-country analysis ensures that our 
results are not an artifact of time-invariant differences across countries. Second, any time-invariant biases 
that manifest differently across different industries in different countries are also captured by our 
(country*industry) fixed effects in Column (2) of Tables 5-6. To the extent that the effects of sample 
selection bias of this nature do not change significantly across time, the difference-in-difference tests 
provide robust evidence that such bias does not drive our results. 
It might still be possible that sample selection problems explain our results of Tables 5-7 if such 
biases coincide with the country-level legal changes we test. We test directly for this possible sample 
selection bias in Table 8. If a legal change affected the number of CDF financing rounds per project, we 
should observe changes in the average maturity for CDF loans following a legal change. Column (1) of 
Table 8 shows no significant change in CDF loan maturity following a legal change. Therefore, we 
conclude that this sample selection problem is unlikely to be driving our results. 
2. Alternatives to CDF 
A second sample selection concern involves the existence of financing alternatives to CDF 
besides PF that we have not considered in our analysis. Equity financing, public debt, and internal 
financing at the sponsor level may also be potential alternatives to CDF. If the choice between CDF and 
any of these alternatives varies with investor protection, this could bias our results. First, consider equity 
financing. Since dispersed equity is relatively unattractive to investors in countries with weak investor 
protection, equity financing is relatively more likely to displace PF in countries with strong investor 
protection. Therefore, we are likely to undercount the equity-financed alternatives to PF by a greater 
margin in countries with stronger investor protection. Consequently, compared to the use of PF in the 
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population, our neglect of equity financing possibilities leads us to overestimate the likelihood of PF in 
countries with strong investor protection. But our hypothesis is that PF is used relatively less in countries 
with strong investor protection, so this bias works against our hypothesis. In a similar vein, dispersed 
public debt offers a practical alternative to PF only in countries with well-developed corporate bond 
markets, which are correlated with strong investor protection as well. Therefore, as with the equity 
financing alternative, the public debt alternative also stacks the odds against our finding results consistent 
with our central hypothesis. 
Finally, consider internal financing. We anticipate two offsetting dynamics here. First, in 
countries with weak investor protection, managers are more likely to steal, which may make internal 
financing less likely because managers would rather steal free cash than invest it. Second, in weak legal 
regimes, information asymmetry may be severe, causing external financing alternatives to be scarce and 
leaving internal financing as the only alternative. Thus, the overall effect of investor protection on internal 
financing may be positive or negative. Irrespective of this net effect, our difference-in-difference tests in 
Tables 5-6 control for any time-invariant levels of over- or under-estimation in the percentage of PF deals 
at both the country-level and the country-industry level. 
It is possible that following the legal changes we identify, firms altered the proportion of projects 
that were internally financed. To investigate this possibility, we test using the subsample of our borrower 
firms for which financial data are available in Global Compustat. Since Rajan and Zingales (1998) define 
external financing as one minus the ratio of Cash Flow from Operations to Capital Expenditures, we use 
the ratio of Cash Flow from Operations to Capital Expenditures as our measure of internal financing.11 
Column (2) of Table 8 shows the results of our tests, which include firm and year fixed effects. We find 
that changes in investor protection had no significant effect on internal financing employed by firms in 
our sample. Therefore, our primary findings are not an artifact of under- or over-estimation of the 
likelihood of PF from a failure to consider internal financing as an alternative financing device. 
                                                     
11 As in Rajan and Zingales (1998), cash flow from operations equals Compustat cash flow from operations plus 
decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in payables. 
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3. Deal Size and Dealscan 
Finally, besides affecting the choice of PF versus CDF, investor protection might also affect deal 
size in a way that biases our results, because the Dealscan database includes only large deals. Suppose 
that creditor rights do not affect the likelihood of PF at all, but instead are positively correlated with CDF 
loan size. CDF might be as likely relative to PF in countries with weak creditor rights as those with strong 
creditor rights, but the smaller CDF loans in weaker creditor rights countries would drop out of Dealscan's 
coverage, biasing our sample in favor of our hypotheses. Our tests would be affected only if this 
(unobserved) sampling bias is correlated not only with the legal changes but also with the interaction of 
the legal changes with the U.S. measure of free cash flow to assets. Nevertheless, we test for this 
possibility using the logarithm of deal size as the dependent variable. The results in Column (3) of Table 
8 show no significant change in deal size coinciding with the legal changes. In unreported tests, we also 
investigate whether the legal changes affect deal size for the separate subsamples of PF and CDF loans. 
We find no statistically significant change in deal size coinciding with the legal changes for either sub-
sample. Therefore, we do not believe our results are driven by this sampling criterion. 
In sum, our difference-in difference and triple-difference tests relying on exogenous legal 
changes as well as exogenous inter-industry variation induced by these legal changes enable us to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns as well as sample selection concerns. Our tests therefore provide strong 
support for the causal effect of investor protection laws on the choice of PF versus CDF. 
VII. Distinguishing PF from Related Mechanisms 
We have explained PF as a unique arrangement with both organizational and contractual features 
that work in tandem to offer a private substitute for investor protection laws by making Project cash flows 
verifiable. Here, we distinguish PF from related organizational and contractual mechanisms, which offer 
features similar to PF, but which are by themselves insufficient to make cash flows verifiable. 
Separate legal incorporation significantly reduces the cost and difficulty of monitoring 
managerial actions. However, what is also essential to PF is that the sponsor own and operate only a 
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single, discrete project. Only this combination of separate incorporation and a single project enables 
transparent cash flow separation. A subsidiary with multiple projects, for example, offers no advantage as 
to cash flow separation and monitoring compared to the parent. Rather than monitoring commingled cash 
flows from numerous assets, and trying to sort out noisy signals on managerial skill, the PF lender 
monitors relatively simple cash flow streams from a single asset. If the subsidiary company houses 
multiple projects, the extensive contractual constraints on cash flow necessary to effective monitoring are 
as costly to the subsidiary as they are to the corporate parent in terms of lost managerial flexibility. 
CDF in the form of secured debt offers some of the advantages of PF, but, again, is not a 
substitute. Secured debt with high leverage (SDHL), for example, offers two advantages of PF. SDHL 
collateralizes corporate debt with specific assets in the same way that PF does. The high leverage also 
reduces agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the amount of free cash a manager has available in 
any period. What SDHL misses, however is cash flow verifiability and concomitant control of the cash. 
With PF, very little cash is likely ever to be free cash. Even after project expenses and scheduled debt 
service have been paid in a given period, the cash flow waterfall arrangement dictates the use of any 
remaining cash. The waterfall arrangement adjusts to absorb any free cash, whether the project generates 
more or less cash flow than originally anticipated. The standard excess cash flow sweep covenant of 
Corporate Debt cannot effect the finely tuned cash management embodied in the cash flow waterfall 
arrangement of PF. Therefore, SDHL cannot explain our main hypothesis – the inverse relationship 
between the likelihood of PF and the strength of legal protections for outside investors. 
Finally, PF requires this tight control of cash since the lender can look only to project cash flows 
for repayment. More so than with CDF, where multiple projects and growth opportunities offer some risk 
diversification, the PF lender must guard against the possibility that future cash flows may be poor. This 
vigilance requires the cash flow waterfall arrangement with its multiple lender-monitored cash accounts. 
This feature further distinguishes PF from subsidiary incorporation with multiple projects and SDHL. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
We investigate Project Finance as a private response to inefficiencies created by weak legal 
protection of outside investors. For large investment projects, Project Finance offers a contractual and 
organizational substitute for investor protection laws by making cash flows verifiable, thereby enhancing 
debt capacity. Project Finance makes cash flows verifiable through: (i) contractual arrangements made 
possible by structuring the Project Company as a single, discrete project legally separate from the 
sponsor; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that ensures 
lender control of project cash flows. Comparing the incidence of bank loans for Project Finance with 
regular corporate loans for large investments ("Corporate Debt Finance"), we show that Project Finance is 
more likely in countries with weaker laws against insider stealing and weaker creditor rights laws. 
While we focus on private debt alternatives to Project Finance, our results may have broader 
implications. In weak legal environments, Project Finance may be preferable not only to Corporate Debt 
Finance, but also to equity and public debt finance since weak investor protection laws reduce their 
attractiveness. If this conjecture holds, then our findings may extend to the choice of Project Finance 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Project Finance by Country versus Creditor Rights 
The y-axis plots the percentage of Project Finance deals in a country while the x-axis plots the DMS 
creditor rights. Higher values indicate greater creditor rights. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Percentage of Project Finance by Country versus Protection Against Insider 
Stealing 
The y-axis plots the percentage of Project Finance deals in a country while the x-axis plots the DLLS 
(2006) proxy for protection against insider stealing. Higher values for the x-variable indicate greater 
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Figure 3: Effect of Exogenous Creditor Rights Changes on Project Finance 
For each figure below, the y-axis plots the residuals from the regression of the percentage of Project 
Finance deals in a country on country and year fixed effects for: (i) countries experiencing an increase 
(decrease) in Creditor Rights; and (ii) countries without a change in creditor rights, i.e. the set of countries 
not included in panel A of table 4. The top figure shows the effect for countries with creditor rights 
increases, while the bottom figure shows the effect for countries with creditor rights decreases. The x-axis 
represents years before/after a legal change. For each country experiencing a creditor rights change, the 
year 0 for the control group of countries is defined as the year of the change in the treatment country. For 
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Figure 4: Effect of Exogenous Increases in Shareholder Derivative Suit Rights  
on Project Finance 
The y-axis plots the residuals from the regression of the percentage of Project Finance deals in a country 
on country and year fixed effects for: (i) countries experiencing an increase in Shareholder Derivative 
Suit Rights; and (ii) countries without a change in rules governing shareholder derivatives suits, i.e. the 
set of countries not included in panel B of table 4. The x-axis represents years before/after a legal change. 
For each country experiencing an increase in Shareholder Derivative Suit Rights, the year 0 for the 
control group of countries is defined as the year of the change in the treatment country. For each of the 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 








Observations 7763 2351 8327 
Deal Amount (in $ millions) 
Mean 255.2 215.5 244.4 
Median 123.9 155.0 100.0 
Std. Devn. 482.2 597.9 635.1 
Minimum 10 10 10 
Maximum 10513.8 10586.3 10588.9 
Maturity (in years) 
Mean 10.7 10.5 10.4 
Median 10.6 10.5 10.4 
Std. Devn. 0.7 0.4 0.4 
Minimum 9.5 9.5 9.5 
Maximum 20.0 12.8 12.8 
Number of Lenders 
Mean 7.1 5.3 5 
Median 4 3 3 
Std. Devn. 7.4 6.1 6.4 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 50 48 97  
Panel B: Project and Corporate Debt Finance Deals by Industry 








Construction 15-17 188 888 1076 83% 
Manufacturing 20-39 3702 1392 5094 27% 
Mining 10-14 566 674 1240 54% 
Real Estate, Insurance  
     and Other Finance 60-67 1564 1121 2685 42% 
Retail/Wholesale/Distributors 50-59 1127 224 1351 17% 
Services 70-89 1929 727 2656 27% 
Transportation      40-49 1602 2737 4339 63%  
Panel C: Summary Statistics for the Main Explanatory Variables 
 Observations Mean Std. Devn. Minimum Maximum 
Ex-post private control of self-dealing 18257 0.87 0.19 0.09 1 
Creditor Rights 18257 1.54 1.00 0 4 
Change in Derivative Suit Rules 18257 0.18 0.25 0 1 
Creditor Rights Change 18257 0.07 0.13 0 1 
Free Cash Flow to Assets 18257 0.14 0.17 -2 2 
Asset Tangibility 18257 0.35 0.37 0 1 
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Table 2: Distribution of Project Finance and Corporate Debt Finance by Country 







English:     
Australia 884 393 521 59% 
Canada 534 437 97 18% 
Hong Kong 688 437 281 41% 
Israel 30 19 11 37% 
Ireland 145 65 80 55% 
Malaysia 440 199 265 60% 
New Zealand 125 60 65 52% 
Singapore 294 167 127 43% 
South Africa 120 56 64 53% 
Thailand 386 227 159 41% 
USA 5184 3461 1823 35% 
United Kingdom 1992 1553 439 22% 
All English Legal Origin 10822 7074 3932 36% 
All English Legal Origin excluding U.S. 5638 3613 2109 37% 
French:     
Argentina 146 65 81 55% 
Belgium 100 55 45 45% 
Brazil 108 49 59 55% 
Chile 118 51 67 57% 
Colombia 180 90 90 50% 
Egypt 150 70 80 53% 
France 118 68 50 42% 
Greece 106 56 50 47% 
Indonesia 562 247 315 56% 
Italy 858 411 447 52% 
Lithuania 30 15 15 50% 
Mexico 986 463 523 53% 
Netherlands 104 54 50 48% 
Philippines 338 141 197 58% 
Portugal 105 39 66 63% 
Romania 60 28 32 53% 
Spain 292 87 205 70% 
Turkey 250 100 150 60% 
Venezuela 190 60 130 68% 
All French Legal Origin 4801 2149 2652 55% 
German:     
Bulgaria 80 44 36 45% 
Germany 548 317 231 42% 
Japan 174 133 41 24% 
Korea (South) 340 163 177 52% 
Switzerland 105 70 35 33% 
Taiwan 736 353 383 52% 
All German Legal Origin: 1983 1080 903 46% 
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Scandinavian:     
Finland 112 48 64 57% 
Norway 110 74 36 33% 
Sweden 104 64 40 38% 
All Scandinavian Legal Origin: 326 186 140 43% 
Socialist:     
Azerbaijan 50 31 19 38% 
Kazakhstan 30 19 11 37% 
Russia 245 139 106 43% 
All Socialist Legal Origin: 325 189 136 42% 




Table 3: Key Explanatory Variables   
Variables Description Sources 
Ex-post private control 
of self-dealing 
Index of ex-post control over self-dealing transactions.  Average 




An index aggregating four different credit rights: restrictions on 
entering reorganization, no automatic stay on secured assets, 





Equals 1 if it is a non-recourse loan to finance a specific project, 
0 if the loan is a Capital Expenditure loan or  a Corporate 




A loan for capital expenditures purpose Dealscan 
Corporate Purpose 
Term Loan 
A term loan categorized as “Corporate Purposes” in Dealscan 
with minimum loan amount (converted in dollars) $0.5mm 
Dealscan 
Free Cash Flow to 
Assets (U.S.) 
The median measure of free cash flow divided by book value of 
assets, where the median is calculated for the 2-digit SIC industry 
for U.S. firms. Free Cash Flow to Assets is computed as net 
income plus depreciation and amortization minus capital 
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Table 4: Countries experiencing changes in legal investor protection 
The list of countries with creditor rights changes is drawn from Appendix A of Djankov, S., McLeish, C. 
and Shleifer, A. (2007). The list of countries with changes governing shareholder derivative suits is drawn 
from Siems et al. (2008).  
Panel A: Creditor Rights Changes Panel B: Changes Governing Shareholder Derivative Suits 
Country Year Increase/ Decrease? Country Year Description of change 
Azerbaijan 1997 Increase Australia 2000 Instituted 
Bulgaria 2000 Increase Chile 2000 Instituted 
Indonesia 1998 Decrease Germany 1998 Minimum share ownership required for enforcing claims changed from 10% to 5% 
Israel 1995 Decrease Italy 1998 Minimum share ownership required for enforcing claims changed from 10% to 5% 
Japan 2000 Decrease Mexico 2001 Minimum share ownership required for enforcing claims changed from 33% to 15% 
 2002 Increase    
Kazakhstan 1997 Increase    
 1998 Increase    
 2001 Decrease    
Lithuania 1995 Increase    
 1998 Increase    
Romania 1994 Increase    
 2003 Increase    
Russia 1994 Increase    
 1998 Decrease    
 2004 Increase    
Spain 2004 Increase    
Sweden 1995 Decrease    
Thailand 1999 Decrease    
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Tests Using Exogenous Country-Level Legal Changes 
All columns report results relating to creditor rights and changes in rules governing shareholder derivative 
suits. Columns 1-2 report logit results using a deal-level sample with various fixed effects. Columns 3-5 
report OLS results using an industry-level sample with country, industry and year fixed effects, and using 
industry level averages of the deal level control variables. We compute cluster-robust t-statistics using the 
cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix method where the clustering is done at the country 
level. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable is: Prob (PF=1) % PF Ln (PF Loans) Ln (PF Loans/GDP) 
Sample: Deal Industry, Country, Year 
Regression model: Logit Logit OLS OLS OLS 
Creditor Rights  -0.054*** -0.044*** -0.072*** -0.158* -0.075*** 
(6.08) (3.85) (5.17) (3.50) (3.25) 
Change in Derivative 
Suit Rules  
-0.091*** -0.093*** -0.137*** -0.073* -0.135*** 
(4.65) (3.83) (4.85) (3.26) (3.18) 
All in spread drawn 0.012 0.008 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 (0.45) (0.28) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
Log of Deal Amount 0.004 0.002 0.027 0.027 0.027 
 (0.50) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
One if Secured 0.021** 0.021** 0.066** 0.095** 0.072** 
 (2.29) (2.63) (2.54) (2.61) (2.56) 
Maturity 0.134*** 0.152*** 0.165*** 0.186*** 0.193*** 
 (7.66) (6.77) (6.60) (6.58) (6.63) 
One if Borrower  0.042 0.038 0.081 0.081 0.081 
not rated (1.55) (1.30) (1.19) (1.20) (1.16) 
One if Senior -0.042 -0.05** -0.024** -0.029** -0.024** 
 (1.70) (2.14) (2.08) (2.12) (2.08) 
Free Cash Flow / Assets 0.152*** 0.113*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.172*** 
 (5.85) (5.55) (5.81) (5.86) (5.78) 
Tangibility 0.124** 0.096* 0.173** 0.138** 0.125** 
 (2.67) (1.82) (2.64) (2.52) (2.54) 
Interest Expense /  0.012 0.005 0.048 0.048 0.048 
Net Income (1.44) (0.59) (1.37) (1.36) (1.37) 
LT Debt / Total Assets 0.337*** 0.23*** 0.345*** 0.356*** 0.29*** 
 (4.36) (3.70) (4.22) (4.35) (4.31) 
Tobin’s Q 0.100 0.063 0.120 0.120 0.120 
 (1.06) (0.70) (1.01) (1.00) (1.02) 
LT Debt / Total Assets *  1.183*** 1.017*** 0.859*** 1.048*** 0.952*** 
Tobin’s Q (8.42) (7.03) (8.16) (8.22) (8.13) 
Log of GDP per capita 0.181** 0.194** 0.183** 0.19** 0.188** 
 (2.47) (2.72) (3.04) (3.06) (3.09) 
Log of Private Credit  -0.030 -0.038 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 
to GDP per capita (0.71) (1.08) (1.29) (1.28) (1.31) 
Borrower FE Yes No N/A N/A N/A 
(Country*Industry) FE  No Yes No No No 
Country and Industry FE  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18257 18257 4515 4515 4515 
R-squared 0.82 0.29 0.42 0.37 0.45 
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Table 6: Dynamic Effects 
All columns examine the dynamic effects of changes in creditor rights and in rules governing shareholder 
derivative suits. Columns 1-2 report logit results using a deal-level sample with various fixed effects 
while Column 3 reports OLS results using an industry-level sample with country, industry and year fixed 
effects. We omit the coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables in the interest of brevity. We 
compute cluster-robust t-statistics using the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix method 
where the clustering is done at the country level. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable is: Prob (PF=1) % PF  
Sample: Deal Deal Industry, Country, Year 
Regression model: Logit Logit OLS 
Forwarded Creditor Rights Change -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 
 (0.71) (1.41) (1.04) 
Contemporaneous Creditor Rights Change -0.026*** -0.033** -0.112** 
 (3.30) (2.66) (2.26) 
Lagged Creditor Rights Change -0.167*** -0.086*** -0.204*** 
 (3.00) (3.41) (4.42) 
Forwarded Change in Derivative Suit Rules -0.012 -0.013 -0.007 
 (1.17) (1.40) (1.47) 
Contemporaneous Change in Derivative Suit Rules -0.014** -0.042** -0.072*** 
 (2.65) (2.29) (4.18) 
Lagged Change in Derivative Suit Rules -0.147** -0.071** -0.135*** 
 (2.25) (2.43) (4.61) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower FE Yes No N/A 
(Country * Industry) FE  No Yes No 
Country and Industry FE  No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18257 18257 4515 
R-squared 0.65 0.18 0.31 
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Table 7: Triple-Difference Tests  
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) report results using Free Cash Flow to Assets (Asset Tangibility) calculated 
for U.S. firms. Columns 1 and 2 report logit results using a deal-level sample. Columns 3 and 4 report 
OLS results using an industry-level sample.  Each specification includes country x year as well as 
industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects. We omit the coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables in 
the interest of brevity. We compute cluster-robust t-statistics using the cluster-correlated Huber-White 
covariance matrix method, clustering at the country level. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable is: Prob(PF=1) Prob(PF=1) % PF % PF 
Sample Deal Industry, Country, Year 
Regression model: Logit OLS 
Creditor Rights * Free Cash Flow to 
Assets (U.S.) 
-0.427**  -0.793***  
(2.24)  (2.85)  
Change in Derivative Suit Rules * Free 
Cash Flow to Assets (U.S.) 
-0.613**  -0.762***  
(2.35)  (2.96)  
Creditor Rights *   0.512**  0.952*** 
Asset Tangibility (U.S.)  (2.69)  (3.42) 
Change in Derivative Suit Rules *   0.736**  0.914*** 
Asset Tangibility (U.S.)  (2.82)  (3.55) 
Free Cash Flow to Assets (U.S.) 0.677*  0.757  
 (2.16)  (1.62)  
Asset Tangibility (U.S.)  0.189  0.336 
  (1.18)  (1.68) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13073 13073 4410 4410 
R-squared 0.73 0.77 0.43 0.51 
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Table 8: Additional Robustness Tests 
All OLS regressions employ country, year and industry fixed effects. We omit the coefficients and t-
statistics for the control variables in the interest of brevity. We compute cluster-robust t-statistics using 
the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix method.  ***, **, * represent coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable is: Maturity of CDF 
loans 
Cash Flow from Operations / Capital 
Expenditures 
Log (Deal Size in 
$m) 
Creditor Rights  1.760 0.256 1.877 
(1.54) (1.57) (1.26) 
Change in Derivative Suit 
Rules  
1.006 0.304 1.160 
(1.12) (1.41) (1.32) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower FE No No No 
Country, industry and year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.28 0.37 0.37 
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Appendix to Tables:  Description of Control Variables and their Sources 
Variables Description Sources 
Country Level Data   
GDP per capita Real gross domestic product per capita Penn World Tables 
Private credit to GDP per capita Ratio of Private credit to gross domestic product per capita Penn World Tables 
Industry-level data   
Tobin’s Q The median Tobin’s Q for the 4-digit SIC industry. Tobin’s 
Q is computed as the ratio of the Market Value of Assets to 
their Book Value. The Market Value of Assets is 
constructed as the total book value of assets minus the 
book value of common equity minus the book value of 
deferred taxes plus the market value of equity. 
Worldscope 
Asset Tangibility The median net PP&E / total assets for the 4-digit SIC 
industry 
Worldscope 
Long Term Debt / Total Assets The median long term debt divided by total assets for the 
4-digit SIC industry 
Worldscope 
Interest Expense/ Net Income The median of interest expense/ net income " for the 4-
digit SIC industry 
Worldscope 
Deal-level data   
Deal amount The commitment amount at the loan origination, in billions 
of dollars 
Dealscan 
All-in-spread The amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR 
for each dollar drawn down 
Dealscan 
Maturity Loan maturity, in years Dealscan 
Secured Equals 1 if the bank loan is secured by collateral, 0 
otherwise 
Dealscan 
Senior Equals 1 if the lenders are senior creditors, 0 otherwise Dealscan 
 
